1. Aliveness.

Introduces the main premise of the book—that the idea there may be some mind in all things is considered to be a spiritual, rather than rational view, is the myth of human exceptionalism. The book opens by raising the question of whether the no-brained slime mould’s ability to solve mazes, to learn and anticipate future events, has yet made the impact that it should on the philosophy of mind.

2. A breed apart?

I consider whether it is possible to make an independent assessment of other animal intelligence. The chapter then describes how the philosophical views of Descartes on the one hand, and Darwin on the other, defined competing approaches to the minds of other animals into the late 20th century. However, as the evidence now shows other animals can have significant abstract thought, self-awareness, emotion and even language, there has been a definite shift in the scientific consensus in the 21st century. Science now finds more similarities than differences between our minds and those of other species, and so, the myth of human exceptionalism may finally have had its day.

3. Intelligent life without a brain.

This chapter looks at recent evidence of responsiveness in plants and other organisms that lack a brain. It gives more detail of the amazing capabilities of slime mould, such as an awareness of time, teaching and learning and overcoming its apprehensions. It examines Darwin's “root brain” hypothesis, Susan Simard's concept of the “Wood Wide Web”, the movement of plants in the work of Stefano Mancuso, plant sensing described by Daniel Chamovitz, as well as Monica Gagliano’s experiments that demonstrate learning in mimosa plants. All of these demonstrate that nature is not simply the passive backdrop to the human experience.

4. Small science.

Raises the question of whether quantum physics can inform the debate about mind in all things. I wrote this chapter essentially as a thought experiment, not an attempt to describe reality. However, I observe that the philosophy of idealism (all reduces to mind) is currently being considered by some scientists to explain quantum mechanics. Strangely, this is at the opposite end of the metaphysical scale from modern day sciences’ materialism and physicalism (all reduces to matter and energy). In fact, the alternative that this book argues for—that there is an aspect of mind in all things—is arguably closer to current science than any form of idealism. Again, I believe our looking to an idealist answer is partly a consequence of the myth of human exceptionalism.

5. The non-problems of panpsychism.

Looks at the history of the philosophy of panpsychism (that there is an aspect of mind in all things) and some of the standard criticisms levelled against it, such as the “combination problem”. I also suggest that human consciousness, rather than necessarily being the highest level of awareness in the universe, may instead be the most mediated.

6. Where in the brain are we?

What neuroscience says about who we are. The view of modern neuroscientists, such as Anil Seth, is that human consciousness is a form of controlled hallucination. The second half of the chapter is largely devoted to Dr Mark Solm’s brainstem hypothesis of consciousness, which questions whether animal consciousness is necessarily a product of the cortex, or may be present in all species that possess a brainstem.

7. The myth of separateness and superiority.

How Western culture has wrongly elevated the human species above others. The chapter begins with some cultural theory concerning whether language can truly represent the world, or only represent a conceptual model of the world (Ferdinand De Saussure). I critique the “ancient astronaut” hypothesis, and argue that one reason millions of people wrongly believe that aliens built the pyramids etc., is not the eccentricity of human belief, but a very mainstream idea in our culture—that human beings are somehow exceptional in nature—which inclines us to look for religious, or extra-terrestrial explanations for human inventiveness.

8. The “why” of existence.

Whether there would be a purpose to there being some mind in all matter (I know of none) and how personal philosophies may lead to different conclusions, such as the difference between Darwinian and Lamarckian evolution. Because this book is making a reasoned case for a view found in most ancient spiritual traditions, in this chapter, I look at how mystical experience emphasises the unity of all things.It includes lessons from Dr Jill Bolte-Taylor, whose left-brain stroke forced her mind into a very different perspective than we ordinarily experience, and the insights of Buddhist teacher, Jack Kornfield.

9. The creative universe.

In the last chapter I observe that in some ways nature is more than a simple production line, and is sometimes inventive and creative. For example, an apple pip cannot produce the same variety of apples as its parent, and so we must restrain nature’s inventiveness through grafting. I also observe that the Impressionist painters’ use of the unresolved may reveal something about the nature of consciousness in general. Finally, the creativity of nature also has a tremendous power we may be able to harness, for example through quantum processors, which could require us taking a different philosophical approach to all of nature.